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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STAT~ OF UTAH 
IN THE ~LATTER OF TilE 
EST1\TE AND Gl~~ARDLAN­
SHIP OF JO..:\X OELERICH, 
Incompetent. 
HELEN D. OELERICH, 
Petitioner and Appellant, 
vs. 
JOAN OELERICH, Respondent. 
Case No. 
10005 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
This brief is filed after argtunent, pursuant to the 
agreement of counsel and the Order of Court made ~lay 
12, 1964. It is directed primarily to the arguments made 
in the respondent's brief to the effect that the order 
of the trial court in dismissing the action was appro-
priate because of an alleged agreement by counsel to a 
dismissal. Point I will demonstrate that there is no 
basis for dismissal on this ground. Point II will show 
that reversal of the lower court's order is appropriate 
because the ruling would be prejudicial to the appellant 
in the event another petition was filed. 
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POINT I 
IF THE LOWER COURT'S DISMISSAL 
OF THE PETITION WAS ON THE GROUND 
THAT IT WAS PURSUANT TO AN OPEN 
COURT STIPULATION OF THE ATTOR-
NEYS FOR THE PARTIES, THE ORDER 
WAS ERRONEOUS. 
A. .An agreement to dismiss is not sustained by the 
record. In each of the many instances where the re-
spondent contends that the petitioner's counsel agreed 
in open court that the petition was to be dismissed upon 
the signing of the Trust Agreement, the reference is 
to pages 139 and 140 of the record. The record indicates, 
in these places, that Judge Hanson stated in substance 
at a hearing held August 26, 1963, that it was his recol-
lection that at a hearing held more than a year earlier, 
counsel for the parties had stated that if a Trust Agree-
ment was signed, the petition would be dismissed. N ei-
their Mr. Lee, who presently represents the respondent, 
nor Merlin 0. Baker, who was representing the peti-
tioner at the time of the hearing (August 26, 1963) 
represented the parties at the earlier date. The earlier 
hearing preceded the execution of the Trust Agree-
ment. It was dated May 8, 1962. The earlier hearing 
would have been, therefore, at least fifteen months prior 
to the time when Judge Hanson was remembering it. 
Judge Hanson stated that no record was made of the 
prior hearing (R. 139, 140). There was no minute 
entry. Mr. Baker stated to Judge Hanson that peti-
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tioner had never entered into such an arrangetnent and 
did not have any such arrangement (R. 140). The 
petitioner's position was reiterated in a brief filed with 
.Judge Hanson on September 5, 1963 ( R. 113, 118) 
in which it was again made clear that the petitioner 
denied that there was such representation 1nade to the 
trial judge. 
The reason given for Judge Hanson amounts to 
his testifying, as a witness who allegedly heard a con-
versation, that the conversation occurred, and then as 
a judge, deciding that his own testimony was true. 
Despite the fact the conversation was denied by cotm-
sel for petitioner, she was given no opportunity to be 
heard on the determination of the critical fact. 
It is no disparagement of a trial judge to urge 
that his recollection of an occurrence in open court 
might be erroneous. Every lawyer knows that the reason 
for court reporters is to obtain as great a certainty as 
possible as to the statements of witnesses, the Court, 
and counsel in a judicial proceeding. The Rules pro-
vide that there should be a hearing to determine the 
appropriate record when the trial or other proceeding 
is not stenographically recorded. It is submitted that 
when a trial judge bases an order upon a statement 
made to him fifteen months earlier, during argument 
on a motion, and the judge is notified that one of the 
litigants disputes his recollection of the events, that at 
least an opportunity should be afforded to determine 
the accuracy of the judge's recollection. It is certainly 
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understandable that any judge having matters before 
him day after day for fifteen or sixteen months could 
have a lapse of memory or an inaccurate recollection 
of the precise statements made by counsel. 
The point is that in the instant case, Judge Hanson 
afforded no opportunity for hearing on the factual 
question as to whether the petitioner's first attorneys 
made the kind of statements which were imputed to 
them. He assumed the existence of a disputed fact with-
out any support in the record. 
B. If there was a stipulation~ it failed to comply 
with the provisions of Section 78-51-32, U.C.A. 1953 
as amended. The statute says: 
"An attorney and counsel has authority ... 
( 2) to bind his client in any of the steps or 
action of a proceeding by his agreement filed 
with the clerk or entered upon the minutes of 
the court and not otherwise.n (Emphasis sup-
plied.) 
Respondent admits that this provision of the statute 
was not satisfied. It is interesting that there is in the 
file a typed form of agreement to the effect that the 
petition would be dismissed. This piece of paper, how-
ever, dated the"---- day of May, 1963," and prepared for 
signature of Mr. Lee and Mr. Baker, is not signed by 
anyone and there is no indication as to the person who 
prepared it or the purpose that it was to serve (R. 102, 
103}. Certainly there is no minute entry or written 
agreement signed by anybody which complies with the 
provisions of the statute. 
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In construing the statute, the Court said, in 
lUcWhirter l'. Donaldson et al (1909) 36 Ut. 293, 104 
P. 737: 
"The stipulation in question was neither filed 
with the clerk nor otherwise made a matter of 
record; therefore appellant cannot claim any-
thing for the stipulation because, under the fore-
going proYisions of the statute, neither he nor 
his counsel had any legal right to rely upon it." 
The Utah court cited the California case of Borkheim 
v. N.B. & M. Ins. Co.~ 38 Cal. 623, and quoted with 
approval the following language: 
"It declares such agreements null and void 
unless they are in writing and filed with the clerk 
or have been entered in the minutes of the court. 
Of such agreement, therefore, there can be no 
specific performance. To allow the court to en-
force them, as was done in this case, against the 
will or without the consent of the parties, is to 
allow the court to work the precise mischief 
which the statute was designed to prevent. In-
stead of being nullified in that way, the statute 
ought to be strictly.adhered to, for it is the dicta-
tion of wisdom. Without it the court would be 
frequently annoyed by disputes between counsel 
concerning their agreements, and thus forced to 
try innumerable side issues more perplexing than 
the case itself, attended, also, with delay to its 
business, and the detriment to the public service." 
As in the Borkheim case, failure to follow the 
statute results in the very mischief which it was designed 
to prevent. Unless it is followed, the trial courts will 
inevitably be led to trying side issues which might be 
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more perplexing than the case in chief. Particularly 
where the court below was advised that counsel disputed 
the court's recollection of the alleged stipulation, failure 
to apply the provisions of the statute was clearly erro-
neous. Judge Hanson indicated that he believed that 
the agreement would have been binding under the 
statute (R. 140). It is submitted that this is clearly an 
erroneous assumption, particularly under the circwn-
stances of this case. The general rule is that an attorney 
does not have implied authority to have an action dis-
continued or dismissed where such a continuance or 
dismissal may operate as a bar to the institution of 
a new action. See annotation A. uthority of A. ttorney 
to Dismiss or Otherwise Terminate Action, 56 ALR 
( 2d) 1290, particularly at pages 1291, 1292. Respond-
ent cites Gagnon Co. v. Nevada Desert Inn, 45 Cal (2d) 
448, 289 P (2d) 466. (Respondent's brief, 7-8). But 
even in that case, the Court stated that the apparent 
conflict in the cases could "be reconciled on the theory 
that there is a rebuttal presumption that he had such 
authority." Even if Judge Hanson was to indulge the 
presumption that counsel was authorized to dismiss 
the proceeding, he was put on notice that the client 
had never entered into any such agreement and that 
if any such statements were made by counsel, they were 
not authorized (R. 140). An opportunity should have 
been afforded to the petitioner to present evidence to 
rebut the presumption which Judge Hanson thought 
existed. This is particularly true where the alleged 
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C. 'l'he c.:ondul't of the parties does not indicate 
that any stipulation for dismissal existed. The Trust 
.. Agreement with the Chicago bank was executed )lay 
8, 1962 (R. 76). Mr. Lee was retained as counsel for 
the respondent in September, 1962 (R. 139). For at 
least three or f9lll mo~ths immediately prior _to the 
filing of the motion to di~miss. (July 10, l963, lt~ 73, !1()) 
Mr. Lee and .1\I_r. llaker ':"ere engag,eq in settl~ment 
negotiations involving a possibility of dismissing the 
action if the respondent would submit to a ment.al ex-
amination ( R~ 141) ~ Certainly Mr. Lee would have 
been advised by prior counsel of a stipulation to di'smiss 
if one would ha v·e been thought to be in existence. No 
purpose would have been served by his continuing to 
negotiate for three or four months after he made an 
appearance in the case if he believed that the peti-
tioner was o'Qligated to dismiss it under a. prior agree-
ment. 
Moreover~ the motion· filed · by· Mr. _ Le.e was not 
upon the ground that the petitioner. was bound hy a 
prior stipulation; it was, instead, on the ground that 
petitioner had not been diligent ~n proceeding and that 
the Trust Agreement ·protects the· property of··the re-
spondent from artful or designing persons (R. 74, 75). 
The inadequacy of these grounds- was demonstrated· in 
appellant's main brief. ·If counsel had believed that 
there was an agreement along the lines :which Judge 
Hanson referred, to in his testimony, it is reasonable 
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These circumstances belie the existence of an un-
derstanding between the parties. 
POINT II. 
THE ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT 
SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE IT IS 
A FINAL APPEALABLE ORDER. 
At the oral argument on May 12, the question 
was raised as to whether Judge Hanson's ruling was 
an appropriate subject for an appeal because peti-
tioner may, presumably, at any time, file a new petition 
asserting incompetence. 
Respondent has referred to cases concerning the 
authority of attorneys where a dismissal was entered 
without prejudice (Respondent's brief, pp. 6-13). It 
is clear, however, that these cases are not applicable to 
the present case because by virtue of Rule 41 (b) of 
the Rules of Civil Procedure, the instant case was dis-
missed with prejudice. 
It is clear, as the respondent points out in her brief, 
that the Rules of Civil Procedure are applicable in 
determining whether or not the instant case is appeal-
able. While the Rules do not apply to uncontested 
guardianship proceedings, Rule 41 (b) makes them 
applicable upon joinder of issue. Neither the record 
nor the order itself supports respondent's contention 
that the dismissal was under Rule 41 (a). Plaintiff's 
own brief argues that it is a dismissal under Rule 41 (b), 
10 
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nt least with respect to that part of the order that dis-
Inissed for failure to prosecute ( H.espendent's brief, 
pp. ~i-i7). Eve11 if one concedes the highly questionable 
existence of an agreen1ent to stipulate to dismissal, it 
is inconceivable that the attorneys for the alleged in-
competent would have entered into a stipulation that 
gave them only the assurance of a dismissal without 
prejudice which would permit the petitioner to at any 
time commence another proceeding. 
It is abundantly clear that the Court's order was 
made under· Rule 41 (b) -with respect to both grounds. 
It is apparently based on failure to prosecute and 'that 
the Trust Agreement negated a right to relief. 
Respondent's own argument (Respondent's. brief, 
pp. 22-27): supports the view that, in part at least, the 
order was made .under Rule 41 (b) ; Respondent urges 
that the order was proper because it was for failure to 
prosecute diligently. The Rule provides that any dis~ 
missal under this subsection 41 (b) or any other dis-
missal other than. one granted under· 41 (a). operates 
as an adjudication on the merits unless the court other-
wise specifies. Respondent concedes, and the court's 
order affirms that the court did not otherwise specify 
(Respondent's brief, p. 7). This conceded dismissal 
under Rule 41 (b) operated as an adjudication on the 
merits or a dismissal with prejtidice, and as such, it be-
came an appealable final order under Sec. 78-2-2, 
U.C.A. 1953, which provides for appellate review of all 
:final orders and decrees in guardianship proceedings. 
11 
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A petitioner who is denied appointment as a guard-
ian of an alleged incompetent by virtue of a court order 
is entitled to appeal such an order. People v. O~Con­
nell (1941) 38 N.E. (2d) 40, 378 Ill. 346. 
While there does not appear to be any case law on 
the question as to whether a petitioner who has had a 
petition dismissed on the merits can immediately file 
another petition without showing a change in circum-
stances, it seems highly questionable that such rule 
would prevail. To allow indiscriminate filing of peti-
tions of guardianship for alleged incompetency would 
seem to open the door to the very kind of harrassment 
that the respondent seems to fear. It is suggested that, 
upon filing of a second petition, respondent would argue 
that a change in circumstances or mental condition 
should be shown or alleged. Appeal is the proper remedy 
for a petitioner who has been denied a petition of guard-
ianship by a dismissal which was necessarily with 
prejudice. 
Even though there was no hearing on the merits 
of the petition, the errors inherent in failure to allow 
presentation of the issues on the merit are manifestly 
prejudicial. 
CONCLUSION 
The order of the District Court was erroneous 
upon each of the grounds discussed in appellant's open-
ing brief, and upon the further ground that no open 
12 
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.~-
~ 
court s'tlipu~t&:d it. The ruling was prejudicial to peti-
tioner and appealable under the rules. This court should 
reverse the order and reinstate the petition. 
May 26, 1964 
Respectfully submitted, 
GEORGE M. Mc~IILLAN 
1020 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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